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The author goes on to explain that Jehovah's Witnesses seek the
complete exemption from all service accorded under the Act to "regular
or duly ordained ministers of religion," since every Jehovah's Witness
is considered to be an ordained minister. The courts have refused to
give automatic exemption in such cases. This group further contends
they are under no legal obligation to submit to induction or the al-
ternative civilian work provisions for conscientious objectors in lieu of
induction if they had been arbitrarily classified. But by refusing to
comply, they deprive themselves of the opportunity every inductee has
to test the legality of his classification in court at a time and in a man-
ner that does not interfere with the induction process i.e., by habeas
corpus only after induction.
The remaining 1,129 convictions after excluding the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses and Negro "moslems" it is important to consider the nature of
the violations. Thus, of these, 159 were convicted for failure to register,
38 for failure to return questionnaire, 51 for failure to report for pre-
liminary physical examination and eight for counseling evasion. The
balance is as follows: 479 were never ordered to report for military
service, either combatant or noncombatant. This group can be described
as "Absolutists." The remaining cases were defendants charged with
failure to report for induction in armed forces.
Congress was urged while considering the 1940 Act, to follow the
British Act and exempt all conscientious objectors rather than only
those whose conscientious objections are based on religious training
and belief, the author continues, but Congress has refused to do so.
It is therefore seen, the author concludes, that under the 1940 Act all
recalcitrant registrants must be treated as violators of the criminal
provisions of the Act.
Theodore M. Ryan.
RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE BusI-
NESS - PROPRIETY OF INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN
FEDERAL COURTS.--On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
This was an action by Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Charles J. Mc-
Laughlin,' Tax Commissioner for the State of Connecticut, for injunc-
tion and a declaratory judgment of the nonliability of plaintiff for the
Connecticut corporation business tax. Conn. Gen. Stat. Supp. 1935,
Sec. 418c, as amended by Conn. Gen. Stat. Supp- 1939, Sec. 354e. This
writ was prosecuted to review a decision of the Circuit Court of Ap-
1 65 S. Ct. 152, decided Dec. 4, 1944.
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peals,2 reversing a judgment in the District Court granting the injunc-
tion and declaration prayed for.3
The petitioner, a Missouri corporation, was engaged exclusively in
the interstate trucking business. It carried on no intra-state business
in Connecticut, nor was a certificate of convenience and necessity is-
sued to it for that purpose. It-maintained freight terminals in that
state solely for the purpose of engaging in its interstate business. Peti-
tioner was, however, pursuant to law, registered with the Connecticut
secretary of state, and had designated an agent in Connecticut upon
whom process might be served. On this state of facts the State Tax
Commissioner ruled that the petitioner was subject to the above men-
tioned "corporation business" tax. This tax imposed on every corpora-
tion, not otherwise specifically taxed and carrying on business within
the state, "a tax or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carry-
ing on or doing business within the state." Conn. Gen. Stat. Cum. Supp.
1935, Sec. 418c et seq. Accordingly, the State assessed the tax against
the petitioner for the years 1937-40, inclusive, whereupon this suit was
instituted in the U. S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.
Petitioner alleged that the tax levied by the Act did not apply to it; and
in the alternative, that, if it -should be deemed within the scope of the
statute, the tax was repugnant to the Connecticut Constitution as well
as the commerce and due process clauses of the federal Constitution,
Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3, and the 14th Amendment, respectively.
Justice Frankfurter ruling in effect that the federal questions in-
volved had been prematurely anticipated by the petitioner, reflected the
Court's inclination in recent cases to insist that the operation and ul-
timate constitutionality of state tax laws be tested in the courts of the
state affected. Only then will removal of such litigation to the federal
courts be seasonable.
The Court said in part: "But even if the statute hits aspects of an
exclusively interstate business, it is for Connecticut to decide from what
aspect of interstate business she seeks an exaction .... It is for her to
say what is the subject matter which she has sought to tax and what
is the calculus of the tax she seeks .... Answers to these questions must
precede consideration of commerce clause. The tax has not yet been
considered or construed by the Connecticut courts. We have no au-
thoritative pronouncements to guide us as to its nature and applica-
tion.
"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the
process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass
on questions of constitutionality - here the distribution of the taxing
power as between the State and Nation - unless such adjudication is
2 139 F. (2d) 809.
3 47 F. Supp. 671.
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unavoidable. And so, as questions of federal constitutional power have
become more and more intertwined with preliminary doubts about
local law, we have insisted that federal courts do not decide questions
of constitutionality on the basis of preliminary guesses regarding local
law. City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies.4 In re Central Ry. Co. of
New Jersey.5 (See other cases cited in the opinion.) Avoidance of such
guesswork, by holding the litigation in the federal courts until definite
determinations on local law are made by the state courts, merely heeds
this time-honored canon of constitutional adjudication."
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was vacated, and the
cause was remanded to the District Court with directions to retain the
bill pending the determination of proceedings to be brought with rea-
sonable promptitude in the state court, in conformity with the opinion.
David S. Landis.
COPYRIGHT - INFRINGEMENT.-In the case of Gingg v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., et al,1 the plaintiff had composed approxi-
mately fifty to seventy-five songs, many of which she submitted to pub-
lishers, but none were published. In the summer of 1941 she composed
the words and music of the song entitled There'll Never Be Another
You, alleged to have been infringed by the defendants. She made sev-
eral copies of this song, including the one filed with the copyright office
on September 5, 1941. One copy was forwarded to a music publishing
house in New York City. Another was submitted to a publishing con-
cern in the city of Los Angeles known as Melody Lane; still another
copy was sent to an organization called B. M. I. It was her recollection
that she made about five copies of this song in all.
Plaintiff admitted prior to the trial that she had never met either
the defendant Gordon, writer of the lyrics of the alleged infringing
song, or the defendant Warren, composer of the music thereof. Like-
wise she acknowledged that she never submitted her song to any of the
defendants.
The music of plaintiff's composition consists of melody only. The al-
leged infringing song is entitled There Will Never Be Another You. The
defendant Gordon is a nationally known figure in the field of popular
song writing. He testified that he did not know the plaintiff and that
prior to the commencement of the suit he had not heard or read either
the words or the music of plaintiff's song.
4 316 U. S. 168, 62 S. Ct. 986, 86 L. Ed. 1355.
5 136 F. (2d) 633.
1 56 Fed. Supp. 701, decided June 12, 1944.
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The court in finding for the defendant went into great detail in
stating that the words and the beat of the music were different. The
court followed the rule as laid down in the case of Fisher, Inc. v. Dil-
lingham,2 which said in part that to sustain it (an infringement suit)
more must appear than the mere similarity or even identity of the sup-
posed infringement with the part in question. In the last mentioned
case, the court stated that in this lies one distinction between a patent
and a copyright: one may infringe a patent by the innocent reproduc-
tion of the machine, thing or process patented, but the law imposes no
prohibition upon those who, without copying, independently arrive at
the precise combination of words or notes which have been copyrighted.
The court in the instant case further delved into the discussion of copy-
rights by referring to the case of Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc.,3 where the
court explained that the musical signs available for combinations are
about 13 in number. They are tones produced by striking in succession
the white and black keys as they are found on the key board of a
piano. In a popular song, the composer must write a composition ar-
ranging combinations of these tones, and is limited by the range of the
ordinary voice and by the skill of an ordinary player. Necessarily, with-
in these limits, there will be found some similarity of tone succession.
To constitute an infringement of the appellant's composition, it would
be necessary to find a substantial copying of a substantial and material
part of it. The court in the present case failed to find any substantial
similarity between the music or lyrics of the respective compositions
and therefore found for the defendants.
Theodore M. Ryan.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS- PARENT AND CHItD.-In the case of Hart
v. Howell 1 there was an appeal by the plaintiff in error from a decree
of habeas corpus which gave to the appellee the custody of his natural
child. Unless the facts of the case were of a most unusual character, the
court would be required, following a long line of previously adjudicated
cases, to grant the natural parent custody of his child. The facts were
brieflly as follows:
The appellee had married Faye Hart and lived with her until shortly
after the birth of the child in question in 1935. They obtained a divorce
in 1937 by mutual agreement and the appellee gave the mother the
custody of the child, who, in turn, gave him to his maternal grand-
parents who were the appellants in this action. The mother died under
mysterious circumstances in 1944 and neither parent has seen the child,
2 298 F. 145.
3 290 F. 959.
1 19 So. (2d) 317, decided Oct. 3, 1944.
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now nine years old, for several years, although the grandparents gave
both ample opportunity for such visits. Further evidence indicated that
neither parent had contributed to the support of the child either in
material or spiritual aspects. The appellee based his petition upon the
grounds that he had now acquired a comfortable home, a second wife,
and a good job and consequently was in a better position to afford the
child the material benefits of life. He also charged that the moral en-
vironment in which the child was thrust was unwholesome.
Florida's supreme court justice, Tarrell, who wrote the decision,
decided that the facts of the case were sufficiently unusual to warrant a
reversal of the general rule that, all things being equal, the custody of
a minor child should be given to his natural parent. This meant a re-
versal of the decree and the awarding of the child back to the grand-
parents.
Terrell, writing a picturesque decision, said in part: "When the froth
is blown off the evidence, the picture left of the appellants is that of
two good old pioneers, symbols of a type that cleared the forest and
settled the country but who have almost vanished from its face. They
(the pioneers) were not so sophisticated as their sons and daughters
whom they sent to college but their moral convictions were more deeply
rooted... . They were not versed in Latin and Greek but they swore
by the efficacy of quinine and calomel and brought up one of the most
stable generations of sons and daughters that this country has pro-
duced. . . . From the conditions under which he was molded, he im-
bibed a high level concept of God and right and justice, so his spiritual
anchorage was not shaken by the dishwater casuistries of bunkshooters,
hocus-pocus mystics and those who would extract the millennium from
ouija boards."
It would appear that again Justice Terrell has written much sound
law into his unique legal phraseology and when one considers the situa-
tion presented in the instant case it seems manifestly just, from the
child's point of view, that the decree giving his natural parent his
custody be reversed. For, as Justice Terrell pointed out, the love of the
appellee for the child was not the brand "required to furnish and pre-
pare its food, wash its diapers, give it paragoric, and say 'no' one hun-
dred times a day until it enters public school, pay its bills, and plant
in its mind and ear from day to day the thousand and one precepts
essential to make it a competent citizen and social unit in our scheme
of democracy, and love to do it."
Francis J. Paulson.
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LABOR LAW - INJUNCTION.-The case of Walling, Adm'r Wage
and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor v. Payne,' an action to
enjoin alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. To review a
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals,2 which modified and affirmed
a judgment of the District Court denying an injunction, plaintiff brings
certiorari.
The defendant was engaged in production of oil and gas for inter-
state commerce. Prior to October 24, 1938, the effective date of the
Act, defendant's employees worked 8, 10, and 12 hours daily shifts and
were paid a specified wage for each shift. These wages were in excess
of the minimum required by the Act. To secure the same wage levels
after the Act, the defendant made contracts with employees under a
split-day plan. Each shift was divided into two parts. For example, the
first four hours of each eight hour shift were assigned a specific hourly
rate. The remaining hours were treated as "overtime" figured one and
one-half times the regular rate. The contracts also called for no more
than 40 hours to come under the base rate in any one week.
The new contracts were obviously made with the intent to keep the
total wages for each shift the same after the Act as before it. Justice
Murphy, who gave the opinion of the court, affirms these views and
further states that the actual and regular work week was accordingly
shorn of all significance.
Although the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals both
held that the split-day plan of compensation under the decision in
Walling v. Belv. Corp.,8 did not violate the Act, this court disagreed.
It maintained that the split-day plan satisfies neither the purpose nor
the mechanics of the requirement of section 7(a) of the Act, which
limits to 40 per week the number of hours that an employer may em-
ploy any of his employees subject to the Act, unless the employee re-
ceives compensation for his employment in excess of 40 hours at a
rate "no less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he
is employed." 4
The Court asserted that the Act had two purposes: "(1), to spread
employment by placing financial pressure on the employer through the
overtime pay requirement; and (2) to compensate employees for the
burden of a work week in excess of the hours fixed in the Act." See
Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel.5 Neither objective could be obtained
under the split-day plan. In effect there was an 80 hour maximum work
week instead of the allowed 40.
1 65 S. C. 11, decided Nov. 6, 1944.
2 138 Fed. (2d) 705.
3 316 U. S. 62, 62 S. Ct. 1223, 86 L. Ed. 1716.
4 29 U. S. C. A. 207 (a).
5 316 U. S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 1216.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The defendants also violated the basic rules for computing correctly
the actual regular rate contemplated by the Act. The plan in fact per-
petuated the pre-statutory wage scale by providing for a fictitious reg-
ular rate consisting of a figure lower than the rate actually received.
The so-called overtime pay was based on this fictitious rate.
Even though the defendants had ceased the split-day plan two
months after the action was started, a decision on its legality remained.
"Voluntary discontinuance of an alleged illegal activity does not operate
to remove the case from the ambit of judicial power." See Hecht v.
Bowles 6; Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.7 If no
decision were made, the defendants would feel free at any time to
resume the plan.
The judgment of the lower court was reversed with direction to re-
mand the case to District Court for further proceedings in conformity
with the opinion.
The opinion rendered here seems entirely correct, since the de-
fendants were unmistakedly attempting to bypass the Fair Labor
Standards Act through an ingenious subterfuge. If such practices were
allowed, the purpose of the act would be frustrated.
Thomas F. Bremer.
PROCEDURE -HABEAS CoRnpus.-The case of Hawk v. Olson I is a
habeas corpus proceeding instituted by the petitioner, Henry Hawk,
against Neil Olson, warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary, as re-
spondent, to obtain the prisoner's release. From an order denying the
writ the petitioner has appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Petitioner was serving a sentence in a federal penitentiary for an-
other crime, and while serving the federal sentence he was indicted and
brought to trial in the Nebraska courts. Hawk was found guilty of the
crime of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. He was returned to the federal prison to finish his sentence and
when that term in the federal penitentiary expired the federal authori-
ties turned him over to the state authorities in Nebraska.
Petitioner complains that at the time he was tried he was a federal
prisoner incarcerated in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kan-
sas, and therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the state. Further, that
when he had completed his term in the federal prison he was turned
over to the Nebraska authorities and confined in the state penitentiary
without further order.
6 321 U. S. 321, 64 S. Ct. 587.
7 106 Fed. (2d) 579.
1 16 N. W. (2d) 181, decided Nov. 3, 1944.
